To avoid people from simply copying the “age proof” and having others reuse it, a nonce/private key combo is needed. To protect that key a DRM style locked down device is necessary. Conveniently removing your ability to know what your device is doing, just a “trust us”.
Seeing the EU doesn’t make any popular hardware, their plan will always rely on either Asian or US manufacturers implementing the black-box “safety” chip.
It’s that “whatever way” that is difficult. This proposal merely shifts the problem: now the login to that 3rd party can be shared, and age verification subverted.
The site (2) sends the request to the user (1), who passes it on to the service (3) where it is signed and returned the same way. The request comes with a nonce and a time stamp, making reuse difficult. An unusual volume of requests from a single user will be detected by the service.
Strictly speaking, neither needs to know the actual identity. However, the point is that both are supposed to receive information about the user’s age. I’m not really sure what your point is.
both are supposed to receive information about the user’s age
Yes, that’s the point. They should be receiving information about age, and age only. Therefore they lack the information to detect reuse.
If they are able to detect reuse, they receive more (and personal identifying) information. Which shouldn’t be the case.
The only known way to include a nonce, without releasing identifying information to the 3rd parties, is using a DRM like chip. This results in the sovereignty and trust issues I referred to earlier.
To avoid people from simply copying the “age proof” and having others reuse it, a nonce/private key combo is needed. To protect that key a DRM style locked down device is necessary. Conveniently removing your ability to know what your device is doing, just a “trust us”.
Seeing the EU doesn’t make any popular hardware, their plan will always rely on either Asian or US manufacturers implementing the black-box “safety” chip.
The key doesn’t have to be on your phone. You can just send it to some service to sign it, identifying yourself to that service in whatever way.
It’s that “whatever way” that is difficult. This proposal merely shifts the problem: now the login to that 3rd party can be shared, and age verification subverted.
A phone can also be shared. If it happens at scale, it will be flagged pretty quickly. It’s not a real problem.
The only real problem is the very intention of such laws.
How? In a correct implementation, the 3rd parties only receive proof-of-age, no identity. How will re-use and sharing be detected?
There are 3 parties:
The site (2) sends the request to the user (1), who passes it on to the service (3) where it is signed and returned the same way. The request comes with a nonce and a time stamp, making reuse difficult. An unusual volume of requests from a single user will be detected by the service.
Neither 2 nor 3 should receive information about the identity of the user, making it difficult to count the volume of requests by user?
Strictly speaking, neither needs to know the actual identity. However, the point is that both are supposed to receive information about the user’s age. I’m not really sure what your point is.
I must not be explaining myself well.
Yes, that’s the point. They should be receiving information about age, and age only. Therefore they lack the information to detect reuse.
If they are able to detect reuse, they receive more (and personal identifying) information. Which shouldn’t be the case.
The only known way to include a nonce, without releasing identifying information to the 3rd parties, is using a DRM like chip. This results in the sovereignty and trust issues I referred to earlier.
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