So is there a way to apply pressure on the EU to think this through first? Surely they could have different ways that doesn’t lock them in to google services.
According to the users in that issue, the mere application of the API is illegal, as is the dependency. Sooo I dunno what kind of PACs there are in the EU but I would be leaning on and contributing to those.
To avoid people from simply copying the “age proof” and having others reuse it, a nonce/private key combo is needed. To protect that key a DRM style locked down device is necessary. Conveniently removing your ability to know what your device is doing, just a “trust us”.
Seeing the EU doesn’t make any popular hardware, their plan will always rely on either Asian or US manufacturers implementing the black-box “safety” chip.
It’s that “whatever way” that is difficult. This proposal merely shifts the problem: now the login to that 3rd party can be shared, and age verification subverted.
The site (2) sends the request to the user (1), who passes it on to the service (3) where it is signed and returned the same way. The request comes with a nonce and a time stamp, making reuse difficult. An unusual volume of requests from a single user will be detected by the service.
Strictly speaking, neither needs to know the actual identity. However, the point is that both are supposed to receive information about the user’s age. I’m not really sure what your point is.
So is there a way to apply pressure on the EU to think this through first? Surely they could have different ways that doesn’t lock them in to google services.
According to the users in that issue, the mere application of the API is illegal, as is the dependency. Sooo I dunno what kind of PACs there are in the EU but I would be leaning on and contributing to those.
To avoid people from simply copying the “age proof” and having others reuse it, a nonce/private key combo is needed. To protect that key a DRM style locked down device is necessary. Conveniently removing your ability to know what your device is doing, just a “trust us”.
Seeing the EU doesn’t make any popular hardware, their plan will always rely on either Asian or US manufacturers implementing the black-box “safety” chip.
The key doesn’t have to be on your phone. You can just send it to some service to sign it, identifying yourself to that service in whatever way.
It’s that “whatever way” that is difficult. This proposal merely shifts the problem: now the login to that 3rd party can be shared, and age verification subverted.
A phone can also be shared. If it happens at scale, it will be flagged pretty quickly. It’s not a real problem.
The only real problem is the very intention of such laws.
How? In a correct implementation, the 3rd parties only receive proof-of-age, no identity. How will re-use and sharing be detected?
There are 3 parties:
The site (2) sends the request to the user (1), who passes it on to the service (3) where it is signed and returned the same way. The request comes with a nonce and a time stamp, making reuse difficult. An unusual volume of requests from a single user will be detected by the service.
Neither 2 nor 3 should receive information about the identity of the user, making it difficult to count the volume of requests by user?
Strictly speaking, neither needs to know the actual identity. However, the point is that both are supposed to receive information about the user’s age. I’m not really sure what your point is.