it has higher latency, even variable latency if you set up variable hops, and everyone routes the traffic of a lot of other users, so a lot of data they can gather from timing info is noise by default
Yes it has better defenses against timing attacks. Just alone the fact that multiple packets are bundled together makes it harder to identify the route a single package used.
Also, it seems that I2P is more vulnerable against deanonymization when leaving the hidden network, i think the official I2P faq has some info about that, but have not read up upon it myself.
Also, it seems that I2P is more vulnerable against deanonymization when leaving the hidden network, i think the official I2P faq has some info about that, but have not read up upon it myself.
on a quick look I did not find such a mention, but in any case in addition to that, I2P users often don’t have such a fortified browser as Tor users do, so that’s also something to count with.
and maybe it’s not a good idea either to just reconfigure a Tor browser profile for I2P
Garlic routing[1] is a variant of onion routing that encrypts multiple messages together to make it more difficult[2] for attackers to perform traffic analysis and to increase the speed of data transfer.[3]
First sentence. Check up the linked article as source.
Ok, technically still vulnerable in the sense that if you transfer a huge file in excess of other parts of the bundle, it might be identifiable by a bad actor, but that’s really misleading, since i2p has a lot of built in logic that makes that scenario pretty unlikely.
Not only huge files. At the end of the article the author goes on about changing the load or manipulating the timing of the traffic.
For both you need to be part of the network and (to some degree) the traffic you want to trace needs to go through a node you are controlling if i understand it correctly.
With increasing size it becomes more difficult.
Garlic routing[1] is a variant of onion routing that encrypts multiple messages together to make it more difficult[2] for attackers to perform traffic analysis and to increase the speed of data transfer.[3]
First sentence. Check up the linked article as source.
Nope, I2P is still vulnerable to timing attacks. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garlic_routing
isn’t it less vulnerable, though?
it has higher latency, even variable latency if you set up variable hops, and everyone routes the traffic of a lot of other users, so a lot of data they can gather from timing info is noise by default
Yes it has better defenses against timing attacks. Just alone the fact that multiple packets are bundled together makes it harder to identify the route a single package used.
Also, it seems that I2P is more vulnerable against deanonymization when leaving the hidden network, i think the official I2P faq has some info about that, but have not read up upon it myself.
on a quick look I did not find such a mention, but in any case in addition to that, I2P users often don’t have such a fortified browser as Tor users do, so that’s also something to count with.
and maybe it’s not a good idea either to just reconfigure a Tor browser profile for I2P
You linked an article that doesn’t say anything to back up your claim. Why do you say i2p is vulnerable to timing attacks?
First sentence. Check up the linked article as source.
Ok, technically still vulnerable in the sense that if you transfer a huge file in excess of other parts of the bundle, it might be identifiable by a bad actor, but that’s really misleading, since i2p has a lot of built in logic that makes that scenario pretty unlikely.
Not only huge files. At the end of the article the author goes on about changing the load or manipulating the timing of the traffic.
For both you need to be part of the network and (to some degree) the traffic you want to trace needs to go through a node you are controlling if i understand it correctly. With increasing size it becomes more difficult.
I would also like to see prove for your claim.
First sentence. Check up the linked article as source.