I think teleportation is a really interesting philosophical question. If life is deterministic and there is no soul, then there should be no problem with teleportation. From a deterministic atheist perspective it should not be a problem, I wouldn’t teleport myself though 😅
Hi, I’m a naturalistic determinist atheist. I won’t be taking a teleporter. The problem is that my body (which my continuous conscious experience resides in) will get erased if I do.
Replace “dismantled by the teleporter” with “shot in the head,” and it might make it a bit more obvious why it matters that the original you dies. I wouldn’t want to be shot in the head, even if I knew there was a perfect facsimile of me being constructed the moment the bullet entered my brain. The fact that this me would die makes intuitive sense to me.
I think it’s mostly a semantic argument: nothing is being “teleported”, it’s a copy. That copy will surely be a perfect copy of me at time T, and after T we’ll drift and become different folks, but a copy of me is not me, and if you punch the copy it doesn’t hurt me. SOMA showcases it pretty well! Anything else cannot even be conceived, right? And even if matter could be “transported” FTL into a different place, wouldn’t the “zipping” process destroy me? The silver cord would be cut, and even if the person on the other side wakes up feeling like me, I would already be gone. It’s consciousness and the vessel for consciousness, not one or the other.
Well the person being teleported would cease to exist. If life is deterministic then there is no consciousness, just a predetermined path. So my argument is basically that you don’t exist anyways, and by that extension teleportation is not a problem, because the copy is not alive either.
This is the same reason I feel like peoples ideas of being “uploaded to the Matrix” are just as flawed. All of the same talking points but with a digital output. Being uploaded means death because my consciousness will cease to exist and simply be emulated by a computer after.
The only one who gain the benefit of me uploading is everyone but myself.
That one I can almost see happening but not full ‘upload’ style. It would have to be gradual in like a Ship of Theseus’ style where the parts that make you ‘you’ are gradually replaced with digital equivalents.
I like your time T example. Kind of a ship of Theseus theme. If your own body is constantly replacing your cells, are you still the same you from last month? So what’s the difference if the cells are replaced by your own biological mechanisms or this teleporter machine?
Also, if this is a copy, why destroy the original in the first place? I could use a second me. Just the they would be located elsewhere for some time. Maybe they could also develop some kind of merge process where we re-integrate back together and our common experiences become part of the same memory.
Still I prefer the concept of some kind of wormhole or space warp type of teleportation, where you can bend space to move from location a to location b and no matter is destroyed or recreated.
i think the big question is continuity of consciousness. when you sleep or especially when getting surgery and dont dream you just sort of accept that you now are the same you that existed before the disconnect. if when you went under and we tossed you into a teleporter would you know?
What is death? If everything is deterministic, then there is no consciousness. If there is no consciousness, then no death and a copy is pretty much exactly the same
Was it though? I’d argue it was disassembled. And a pen wouldn’t stop being the same pen if you disassemble it, take the pieces somewhere else, and assemble it again. This is the same but at an atomic level.
What is your “original mind” though? Is there such a thing? Are you the same you you were last night? You only “Inhabit yourself” in the present, so the continuity of your mind is just an illusion. For the clone, they would be as “you” as you are, and in fact it would be impossible to tell the difference between you and your clone for anyone, including yourself. Maybe you’re the clone?
There is an easy logic test to see if a person’s “mind” is really in a clone/copy/backup. If the original and the copy exist at the same time would the original perceive itself in two places? If not, then that “exact copy” method doesn’t work … the original just dies and a near copy is made.
Someone mentioned the zombie theory earlier in the post … just about as creepy.
Why would the “original” be able to perceive itself in two places? Are you able to perceive yourself in the past? That was literally you, yet you only perceive the present. There is no reason why you should be able to perceive a brain identical to yours but separated in space either.
Also the point is the “original” doesn’t make sense in the first place, both the copy and you would perceive the same thing in your hypothetical case, because you are the same.
You miss the point. I’m saying you could never be in two bodies at once … thus when a copy is made (transporter, cloning, transfer to a digital backup program,etc) … the original dies. The copy is not the original … unless logic dictates that a mind can be in two bodies at once … which it does not.
I think teleportation is a really interesting philosophical question. If life is deterministic and there is no soul, then there should be no problem with teleportation. From a deterministic atheist perspective it should not be a problem, I wouldn’t teleport myself though 😅
Hi, I’m a naturalistic determinist atheist. I won’t be taking a teleporter. The problem is that my body (which my continuous conscious experience resides in) will get erased if I do.
Replace “dismantled by the teleporter” with “shot in the head,” and it might make it a bit more obvious why it matters that the original you dies. I wouldn’t want to be shot in the head, even if I knew there was a perfect facsimile of me being constructed the moment the bullet entered my brain. The fact that this me would die makes intuitive sense to me.
I think it’s mostly a semantic argument: nothing is being “teleported”, it’s a copy. That copy will surely be a perfect copy of me at time T, and after T we’ll drift and become different folks, but a copy of me is not me, and if you punch the copy it doesn’t hurt me. SOMA showcases it pretty well! Anything else cannot even be conceived, right? And even if matter could be “transported” FTL into a different place, wouldn’t the “zipping” process destroy me? The silver cord would be cut, and even if the person on the other side wakes up feeling like me, I would already be gone. It’s consciousness and the vessel for consciousness, not one or the other.
Well the person being teleported would cease to exist. If life is deterministic then there is no consciousness, just a predetermined path. So my argument is basically that you don’t exist anyways, and by that extension teleportation is not a problem, because the copy is not alive either.
This is the same reason I feel like peoples ideas of being “uploaded to the Matrix” are just as flawed. All of the same talking points but with a digital output. Being uploaded means death because my consciousness will cease to exist and simply be emulated by a computer after.
The only one who gain the benefit of me uploading is everyone but myself.
That one I can almost see happening but not full ‘upload’ style. It would have to be gradual in like a Ship of Theseus’ style where the parts that make you ‘you’ are gradually replaced with digital equivalents.
I like your time T example. Kind of a ship of Theseus theme. If your own body is constantly replacing your cells, are you still the same you from last month? So what’s the difference if the cells are replaced by your own biological mechanisms or this teleporter machine?
Also, if this is a copy, why destroy the original in the first place? I could use a second me. Just the they would be located elsewhere for some time. Maybe they could also develop some kind of merge process where we re-integrate back together and our common experiences become part of the same memory.
Still I prefer the concept of some kind of wormhole or space warp type of teleportation, where you can bend space to move from location a to location b and no matter is destroyed or recreated.
i think the big question is continuity of consciousness. when you sleep or especially when getting surgery and dont dream you just sort of accept that you now are the same you that existed before the disconnect. if when you went under and we tossed you into a teleporter would you know?
Doesn’t matter because your original brain was destroyed. You would be dead and a copy of you would remain.
What is death? If everything is deterministic, then there is no consciousness. If there is no consciousness, then no death and a copy is pretty much exactly the same
Was it though? I’d argue it was disassembled. And a pen wouldn’t stop being the same pen if you disassemble it, take the pieces somewhere else, and assemble it again. This is the same but at an atomic level.
Nope. If it makes a perfect copy of you during transport … you die during the transport.
If you come through with a transporter clone your original mind doesn’t inhabit both of them … so your original mind will not inhabit either of them.
What is your “original mind” though? Is there such a thing? Are you the same you you were last night? You only “Inhabit yourself” in the present, so the continuity of your mind is just an illusion. For the clone, they would be as “you” as you are, and in fact it would be impossible to tell the difference between you and your clone for anyone, including yourself. Maybe you’re the clone?
There is an easy logic test to see if a person’s “mind” is really in a clone/copy/backup. If the original and the copy exist at the same time would the original perceive itself in two places? If not, then that “exact copy” method doesn’t work … the original just dies and a near copy is made. Someone mentioned the zombie theory earlier in the post … just about as creepy.
That’s stupid, of course you don’t have access to the brain of a different “you”. The moment you get forked into two, there’s now two separate beings.
But none have more claim to be the original than the other, since your continuous experience of reality is only an illusion anyway.
Why would the “original” be able to perceive itself in two places? Are you able to perceive yourself in the past? That was literally you, yet you only perceive the present. There is no reason why you should be able to perceive a brain identical to yours but separated in space either.
Also the point is the “original” doesn’t make sense in the first place, both the copy and you would perceive the same thing in your hypothetical case, because you are the same.
No, I perceive the past. It is just not editable.
You miss the point. I’m saying you could never be in two bodies at once … thus when a copy is made (transporter, cloning, transfer to a digital backup program,etc) … the original dies. The copy is not the original … unless logic dictates that a mind can be in two bodies at once … which it does not.
It’s one or the other. Cogito ergo sum vs. esse est percipi.
Deterministic atheism isn’t at odds with a soul or non-physicalism. See: Walden Pod
Can you elaborate?