Are there any flies buzzing around?
Clone myself.
Send clone through teleporter to pull lever.
360 no scope snipe the imposter clone motherfucker.
Claim credit for saving people.
Is cloning that much faster than running to the lever? Do you also keep a cloning machin always handy on you?
The teleporter is basically a cloning machine
If you teleport the people off the tracks then you can kill them all while still taking credit for saving them.
Doesn’t it depend if the teleporter open a up a wormhole or used replication?
The Trolly Problem of Thesius
The salesmans trolley problem of Theseus if you try to find out first how to get everywhere efficiently.
You’ve shed and replaced every atom that you were made of when you were born and many times over since then, are you still that same entity?
Yeah, but you didn’t shed them all at once. If the ship of Theseus exploded, and then they built a new one, the question wouldn’t be, “Which is the true ship of Theseus?” it would be, “Hey, did you guys see Theseus’ new ship?”
How many components have to be changed all at once for it to be a new ship?
If all but one of the planks is new but one of them is from the original ship is it still the original ship, if not then how many planks from the original ship need to be included in the new ship for it to be the original ship?
Look at it’s like that. If you change out one part at a time, everyone considers the ship the same.
Change many components at once and what you hear? “It’s practically a new ship!”.
Here, Ship of Theseus solved by instinct and linguistics.
I’d say that it’s a matter of timescale, very little if anything of the initial version of the USS Constitution is part of the current version of the ship but id consider it the same ship just version whatever because it was slowly replaced over a couple hundred years. It’s the side effect of “living” objects, though if there is one old ass ship that is 100% immune to the Ship of Theseus it’s the Vasa.
It’s all just abstract philosophy on a non-reality scenario, I’m just having fun with it.
On a heavily relative note, though, has anyone watched Space Dandy? The show about a dandy guy in space?
Shit like this always remind me of the videogame SOMA.
Have had that game in my library for years, maybe I need to play it
You should. It’s incredible. Just realize it’s a walking sim. If you’re okay with that then def play it.
Yeah that’s fine, Death Stranding was amazing too and that’s mostly a walking sim aswell
That game has the best story and atmosphere I’ve ever seen in my life (maybe except for HL2)
I kinda wish SOMA hit for me but I was already well-aware of the “teleportation problem” and have an established position, so instead I was frustrated at the slow pace of much of the game and annoyed that the protagonist didn’t understand. It felt like “Bioshock at home”.
Half-Life is very different but also extremely good. And that’s despite it not even being my favorite Valve series, Portal is.
If you liked Portal 2, check out The Entropy Centre on Steam. It’s extremely similar but the puzzles are based on a different concept. Super freakin’ fun though. And a great story, just like Portal 2.
Also Portal Revolutions (fan made mod) is absolutely fantastic. It really felt like Portal 3.
And by HL2 you mean Half Life 2? Which has a shitty and unfinished story and way less atmosphere than its original game HL1???
^ This comment was presented by the Combine.
I mean it though. HL1 was way better, storywise. HL2 just had upgraded graphics that couldn’t make up for worse gameplay. That endless water corridor run with the swamp boat at the beginning bored me to hell and back.
Lol ok buddy.
Depends if teleportation uses TCP or UDP
UDP teleportation sounds pretty questionable.
And what compression algorithm are they using?
Quantum mechanic wavelengths in mp3. So you might arrive a bit off.
SCTP
Time to post Existential Comics again
I hate this comic. Your alarm clock is proof that you don’t truly lose consciousness in the way this comic implies when you go to sleep.
Yeah, it’s a weakness in the comic, but you can fix it by imagining being frozen (in a sci-fi way that doesn’t form I’ve crystals that kill you) then thawed.
You’d awake just like from sleep and there would have been a period of true nothing in between.
Did you die and a new you was woken up? I say there is no “true you”. There’s a body having your memories and behavior, thinking it’s you and that’s all that matters. There is no magic piece that actually gets loost when you get frozen or teleported. A you enters, a you leaves, so nobody died and nothing is lost.
There are no souls, there is no magic continuous bit that gets handed over to the next moment, there just the pattern, so as long as it persists, you are alive.
If it’s jot you then the question becomes, are you willing to commit suicide so a reasonable facsimile of you can save some strangers.
I’m willing to die to save people, so if some version of me actually gets to survive it, with there being a chance that it is me, then there’s no reason for me not to do it.
Are you willing to die to save any people?
People dumb enough to nap on a trolley trail? No. rich people? Also no.
Actually this would be faster the other way around.
Orphans with chronic diseases who, should they be saved stand a reasonable chance at a cure and a long, prosperous and happy life?
Also no.
What about someone whose dog will miss them very much?
Also no.
I will take care of the dog.
What about an orphaned baby of a very rich family, when it will grow up it will have a very lavish life through inheritance, but as it stands right now it is just an innocent baby?
I’d pull the lever if I was tied to the other track. The only meaningful difference is that there will be someone who shares my values and experiences roaming the earth after I die. I can live with that.
I wonder if that would inspire him to become healthier and live longer. If I knew someome sacrificed their life so I could live, I would probably treat my body a lot better. Maybe I should go through a transporter…
Define “you.” An identical collection and pattern of atoms and subatomic particles? Then yes. A continuous consciousness as experienced by the “me” on the entry side of the teleporter? No.
Would I kill myself to save five lives and create one? Yes
There is no way to know that were not constantly dying and being replaced. The experience of continuity may be an illusion because you don’t notice that you’re only alive for a split second, and replacing the consciousness that was alive a split second before you.
I say there’s no rational reason to assume you aren’t constantly “dying” and being replaced by next moment’s “you”.
Okay? That’s all well and good, but there is a way to know that a transporter does kill you. Given a choice between maybe living or definitely dying, I’m gonna choose the former.
You’re not a continuous consciousness anyway. Sleep is a thing.
I’d go deeper and say that “continuous consciousness” isn’t a concept that makes sense. You only live in the moment, with access to part of your past selves’ memories.
So there’s no distinction for you between “you have been destroyed and an identical copy of you has been constructed an imperceptible amont of time later” and “an imperceptible amount of time had passed in which nothing has happened to you”
I’d go deeper and say that “continuous consciousness” isn’t a concept that makes sense. You only live in the moment, with access to part of your past selves’ memories.
I posit that consciousness is a chemical process occurring in your brain. This process is continuously ongoing, and when it stops, you die. If a transporter constructs a perfect copy of you, down to the chemical process that constitutes your consciousness, then there is no continuity between your original body and this new one, because it’s a wholly different brain.
When people talk about continuity of consciousness, they usually mean the ego, and believe that when teleporting “you die, but someone else completely indistinguishable from you but somehow not you” is born.
I say that this little piece of magic “you”-ness that doesn’t make the jump just doesn’t exist.
I already explained how the thing that makes the consciousness continuous doesn’t transfer over to the new body. It’s not magic.
Really, all of this philosophical posturing is pointless. When you step into the entrance of the transporter, the entity that experienced stepping into the entrance of the transporter does not experience stepping out of the exit. If that entity is successfully deconstructed, it dies.
Assuming we’re talking about Star Trek/The Prestige style transporter. Some kind of space-bending wormhole that physically transports a body doesn’t kill the user.
You didn’t explain, you begged the question
If you interrupt a chemical process and then let it continue, it’s indistinguishable (and therefore identical) to letting it continue in the first place.
If you’d e.g. freeze your body, it doesn’t matter if you call the frozen state “dead” or don’t: your life would continue if it’s possible to unfreeze you.
Death or no death is meaningless if an indistinguishable individual resumes life after.
My transporter clone and I may be indistinguishable to you, but I can distinguish between us pretty easily. A transporter is not interrupting a chemical process and then letting it continue, it is stopping a chemical process and then starting another one elsewhere. Death or no death is very meaningful to me, the person who is about to be disintegrated at the entrance of this transporter.
The person who shows up at the lever looks like me, acts like me, thinks they’re me, and they are not me. No matter how arbitrarily similar we are, they’re a different person. If the transporter fails to disintegrate me, I do not see through that person’s eyes. I do not hear through that person’s ears. Because they’re a different person.
So it stands to reason that if the transporter does disintegrate me, I still will not see through that person’s eyes nor hear through that person’s ears. And because my eyes and ears are gone, I will never see or hear anything again. There’s a word for this state of existence, in which you do not experience anything.
I hate that comic. Equivocation is a fallacy. Your alarm clock is proof that you don’t lose experiential consciousness when you sleep.
What comic and no it doesn’t. And reading through your exchange with the other guy it’s clear we have very different ideas about the nature of self-identity. I don’t think of my body as necessary for “me” to exist, I am my thoughts and memory rather than my neurons and chemistry. If that information can be copied and transmitted then there will be a “me” that continues from a new location.
There will be a you, but it’s not the same you. If you read my exchange with the other guy, then what are your thoughts on the “shot in the head” topic? Would you be okay with this you being killed in a very real and visceral way, as long as a you would be reconstructed elsewhere?
This here, although teleporters might actually be implemented in a way that transmits the original being to the destination. It’s a fictional technology after all, so why not?
Yeah, I am assuming Star Trek transporters. If it’s a wormhole then it’s fine
What makes you think that “continuous consciousness” is a thing and not just the way it feels like to exist?
Do you fell like you’re made out of cells? Do you feel the hormones influencing your thinking? Then why do you think that the perceived continuity of having an ego is a real thing that exists? No soul has been measured so far.
I’m not a philosopher, so this response will be imperfect and is subject to revision.
Then why do you think that the perceived continuity of having an ego is a real thing that exists?
My current response to this is that something can exist without being made of something. Consciousness is an emergent property of a sufficiently complex, chemically active neurological system. (Someone can poke holes in this definition if they like, but come on dude, principle of charity. You get what I mean.) Essentially, “how it feels like to exist” is a real, if immaterial, thing. Just like mathematics and language.
If someone makes a perfect copy of my brain and body over by the lever, using none of the materials from my original body, then it is a different brain and body, no matter how arbitrarily similar it is. The consciousness that was by the entrance to the teleporter will never experience pulling the lever.
What makes that “new” consciousness less “you” than the old one? Why do you care if the atoms aren’t the same?
If a perfect copy of me was made, both world be me, and then slowly diverge by different experience. But it doesn’t matter which one has most of the atoms of the body that existed before the duplication (or indeed if any of us was). They’ll both be “me”s with their own perspective and then they’d both continue to exist being “me” from their point of view.
But if I don’t do it, I’m not who I think I am.
It won’t be me and, unless I have some loved one there, I’m not thoughtlessly jumping into suicide.
If it’s a wormhole or Niven-style teleporter, it’s unarguably you coming through the process. Star Trek… I’ll grant that the conversation gets a little more complicated.
i think this particular case implies itbis quantum teleportation where your body is destructed and simultaneously reassembled on the other side
I think teleportation is a really interesting philosophical question. If life is deterministic and there is no soul, then there should be no problem with teleportation. From a deterministic atheist perspective it should not be a problem, I wouldn’t teleport myself though 😅
Hi, I’m a naturalistic determinist atheist. I won’t be taking a teleporter. The problem is that my body (which my continuous conscious experience resides in) will get erased if I do.
Replace “dismantled by the teleporter” with “shot in the head,” and it might make it a bit more obvious why it matters that the original you dies. I wouldn’t want to be shot in the head, even if I knew there was a perfect facsimile of me being constructed the moment the bullet entered my brain. The fact that this me would die makes intuitive sense to me.
I think it’s mostly a semantic argument: nothing is being “teleported”, it’s a copy. That copy will surely be a perfect copy of me at time T, and after T we’ll drift and become different folks, but a copy of me is not me, and if you punch the copy it doesn’t hurt me. SOMA showcases it pretty well! Anything else cannot even be conceived, right? And even if matter could be “transported” FTL into a different place, wouldn’t the “zipping” process destroy me? The silver cord would be cut, and even if the person on the other side wakes up feeling like me, I would already be gone. It’s consciousness and the vessel for consciousness, not one or the other.
Well the person being teleported would cease to exist. If life is deterministic then there is no consciousness, just a predetermined path. So my argument is basically that you don’t exist anyways, and by that extension teleportation is not a problem, because the copy is not alive either.
This is the same reason I feel like peoples ideas of being “uploaded to the Matrix” are just as flawed. All of the same talking points but with a digital output. Being uploaded means death because my consciousness will cease to exist and simply be emulated by a computer after.
The only one who gain the benefit of me uploading is everyone but myself.
That one I can almost see happening but not full ‘upload’ style. It would have to be gradual in like a Ship of Theseus’ style where the parts that make you ‘you’ are gradually replaced with digital equivalents.
I like your time T example. Kind of a ship of Theseus theme. If your own body is constantly replacing your cells, are you still the same you from last month? So what’s the difference if the cells are replaced by your own biological mechanisms or this teleporter machine?
Also, if this is a copy, why destroy the original in the first place? I could use a second me. Just the they would be located elsewhere for some time. Maybe they could also develop some kind of merge process where we re-integrate back together and our common experiences become part of the same memory.
Still I prefer the concept of some kind of wormhole or space warp type of teleportation, where you can bend space to move from location a to location b and no matter is destroyed or recreated.
i think the big question is continuity of consciousness. when you sleep or especially when getting surgery and dont dream you just sort of accept that you now are the same you that existed before the disconnect. if when you went under and we tossed you into a teleporter would you know?
Doesn’t matter because your original brain was destroyed. You would be dead and a copy of you would remain.
What is death? If everything is deterministic, then there is no consciousness. If there is no consciousness, then no death and a copy is pretty much exactly the same
Was it though? I’d argue it was disassembled. And a pen wouldn’t stop being the same pen if you disassemble it, take the pieces somewhere else, and assemble it again. This is the same but at an atomic level.
Nope. If it makes a perfect copy of you during transport … you die during the transport.
If you come through with a transporter clone your original mind doesn’t inhabit both of them … so your original mind will not inhabit either of them.
What is your “original mind” though? Is there such a thing? Are you the same you you were last night? You only “Inhabit yourself” in the present, so the continuity of your mind is just an illusion. For the clone, they would be as “you” as you are, and in fact it would be impossible to tell the difference between you and your clone for anyone, including yourself. Maybe you’re the clone?
There is an easy logic test to see if a person’s “mind” is really in a clone/copy/backup. If the original and the copy exist at the same time would the original perceive itself in two places? If not, then that “exact copy” method doesn’t work … the original just dies and a near copy is made. Someone mentioned the zombie theory earlier in the post … just about as creepy.
That’s stupid, of course you don’t have access to the brain of a different “you”. The moment you get forked into two, there’s now two separate beings.
But none have more claim to be the original than the other, since your continuous experience of reality is only an illusion anyway.
Why would the “original” be able to perceive itself in two places? Are you able to perceive yourself in the past? That was literally you, yet you only perceive the present. There is no reason why you should be able to perceive a brain identical to yours but separated in space either.
Also the point is the “original” doesn’t make sense in the first place, both the copy and you would perceive the same thing in your hypothetical case, because you are the same.
It’s one or the other. Cogito ergo sum vs. esse est percipi.
Deterministic atheism isn’t at odds with a soul or non-physicalism. See: Walden Pod
Can you elaborate?
I know how teleportation machines work and I won’t be using one.
Wait, you… you do?
i do too btw
just take any train :-)
The trolley problem but the only way to pull the lever is to take a nap first.
Since your consciousness stopped and then a new was started from the same meat is it still you?
If it is, then surely a new consciousness constructed from a pile of meat identical to your brain would also be you?
Your consciousness doesn’t stop when you’re asleep. Evidence: alarm clocks exist
It does stop. When you are asleep you are unconscious.
